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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The standard for copyright protection is notoriously low – the work must be 
independently created by the author and possess a minimal degree of creativity.1 Nonetheless, 
even with that generous standard, the courts and the Copyright Office recognize that certain 
works do not contain even that minimum level of creativity such that they are categorically 
refused copyright protection.  Blank forms, and other forms that do not convey information, fall 
within this category.2
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divisions.  The author gratefully thanks Tim Feathers, Mike Campbell, Jake Wharton, and Ryan Burke for their 
significant contributions, insight, and comments.  They are not responsible for any errors, for which the author 
accepts all responsibility. 
1 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
2 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (2006). 
2In contrast, and for good reason, the standard for design patent protection is much more 
burdensome.  Design patents protect new, original, ornamental, and non-obvious designs.3 This 
more difficult standard, which generally subsumes the copyright standard, would lead one to 
assume that anything failing the low copyright standard would not be eligible for design patent 
protection.  Then again, one might be wrong.  The Patent and Trademark Office has issued 
design patents for blank forms and recent case law has either upheld design patent protection for 
blank forms or declined to categorically refuse such protection.4
This article explores the blank forms doctrine in copyright law, the overlap between 
copyright and design patent protection, why the law's refusal to protect blank forms under 
copyright law is necessarily inconsistent with the law's protection of blank forms via design 
patents, and possible judicial, Congressional, or administrative solutions to resolve this 
inconsistency. 
 
II.  COPYRIGHT PROTECTION (OR LACK THEREOF) FOR BLANK FORMS 
A.  General Requirements for Copyright Protection 
 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device."5 In 1991, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he sine qua non 
of copyright is originality" and "[t]o qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to 
the author."6 Original, in the context of copyright, means only that the work was independently 
created and "that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity."7 To reemphasize this 
point, the Court reminded us that "[t]o be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; 
even a slight amount will suffice" and that "[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might 
be."8 But even this generous standard does not permit all works to enjoy copyright protection.  
There still exists a "narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so 
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."9 One such category is the white pages telephone 
directory.10 The Supreme Court found that the white pages publisher did not satisfy the 
minimum level of creativity because it was "devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity."11 
Another category of works that fail to meet this modicum of creativity is blank forms. 
 
3 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 171 (2000).  The non-obvious requirement is carried over from the utility patent context from § 
171's clause stating that "[t]he provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for 
designs, except as otherwise provided." Id. at § 171. 
4 See infra Part III.B. 
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
6 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (emphasis in original). 
7 Id. (emphasis added). 
8 Id.; or as metaphorically stated "The creative spark need not create a shock, but it must at least be perceptible to the 
touch."  William Patry, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 201, 208 (2002-2003). 
9 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359. 
10 Id. at 364. 
11 Id. at 362. 
3B.  The Blank Forms Doctrine 
 The denial of copyright protection to blank forms has had and currently has more than its 
fair share of problems.  What started off as a simple conclusory statement by the Supreme Court 
in 1879 has spawned well over one hundred years of debate on the ability to copyright blank 
forms.  As the courts have been unable to agree on exactly what the blank form doctrine is, it is 
difficult to clearly state the rule without exploring its origins, the Copyright Office's regulation 
based upon the doctrine, and the courts' subsequent interpretations thereof. 
 
1.  The History of the Blank Forms Doctrine 
 In 1879, the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Selden,12 which is understood, and arguably 
misunderstood, as the origin of the blank forms doctrine.  In Baker, Charles Selden had prepared 
a book entitled Selden's Condensed Ledger, or Bookkeeping Simplified.13 This book exhibited 
and explained a system of bookkeeping by means of an introductory essay and attached forms 
consisting of ruled lines and headings illustrating the system and showing how to use and carry 
out the bookkeeping method.14 The defendant, Baker, was accused of using a similar 
bookkeeping system, but with a different arrangement of the columns and headings.15 Selden 
contended that "the ruled lines and headings, given to illustrate the system, [were] a part of the 
book, and, as such, [were] secured by the copyright; and that no one [could] make or use similar 
ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on substantially the 
same system, without violating the copyright."16 Importantly, the Court found that the validity of 
this contention was "really the question to be decided in this case."17 
To answer this question, the Court drew "a clear distinction between the book, as such, 
and the art which it is intended to illustrate" and noted that this "proposition is so evident, that it 
requires hardly any argument to support it."18 Despite the clarity of this proposition, the Court 
spent a large portion of its opinion explaining the difference between obtaining a patent for a 
system and securing copyright protection for the explanation of the system.19 The Court also 
repeatedly noted that the description of a system in a book is entitled to copyright, but this does 
not lay the foundation for an exclusive right to the system itself.20 
Despite the Court's tremendous focus on the copyright law not protecting the underlying 
system, the Court's holding was peculiar: 
 
The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not the 
subject of copyright; and that the mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer 
 
12 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
13 Id. at 99-100. 
14 Id. at 100. 
15 Id.
16 Id. at 101. 
17 Id.
18 Id. at 102. 
19 Id. at 102-104. 
20 Id. at 103-105 ("The copyright of a book on perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it may 
contain, gives no exclusive right to the modes of drawing described, thought they may never have been known or 
used before . . . .  But as embodied and taught in a literary composition or book their essence consists only in their 
statement.  This alone is what is secured by copyright."). 
4upon him the exclusive right to make and use account-books, ruled and arranged 
as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book.21 
The peculiarity of the Court's holding is that it finds that the accounting forms, rather 
than the bookkeeping system, were not the subject of copyright.  This holding is consistent with 
the Court's framing of the issue as whether the ruled lines and headings (i.e. the blank forms) 
were entitled to copyright protection.22 Therefore, the idea/expression dichotomy it spent so 
much time explaining could not be the basis for the Court's holding.  However, the Court did not 
provide any additional reasoning supporting its holding. 
Two rationales are suspected.  One is that the blank forms were not sufficiently creative 
to be original and deserving of copyright protection.  The other is that the blank forms are so 
closely related to the system, that the system is incapable of being expressed in any way other 
than the blank forms.  When this occurs, the system and expression merge into one and neither 
are capable of copyright protection.  The merger doctrine provides that when there is "only one 
or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord 
protection to the idea itself," then even the expression is not protected by copyright law.23 The 
merger doctrine was produced as a corollary maxim based on the idea/expression dichotomy.24 
The merger rationale is unlikely.  Because the Court initially found that Baker used a 
different arrangement of the columns and headings, this suggests that the basis of the Court's 
holding was not a merger between the idea and the expression, but something else.  This leaves 
the lack of creativity rationale.  But the Court never cites any authority or even sets forth a rule 
of law supporting this conclusion.  It is from this uncertain holding that the blank forms doctrine 
and its accompanying morass was born. 
 
2.  Subsequent Interpretations of the Blank Forms Doctrine 
a.  Copyright Office Regulations 
 The Copyright Office, which registers copyrightable works, has, since 1899, had 
regulations regarding material not subject to copyright.  The current regulation, promulgated in 
1956, provides: 
 
The following are examples of works not subject to copyright and applications for 
registration of such works cannot be entertained: 
 
*** 
 
(c) Blank forms, such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank 
checks, scorecards, address books, report forms, order forms and 
 
21 Id. at 107. 
22 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
23 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2nd Cir. 1991); see also Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 
F.2d 675, 678-679 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding that permitting copyright protection to such expressions would be to 
"recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated."). 
24 Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705. 
5the like, which are designed for recording information and do not in themselves 
convey information.25 
As noted, this is not a new regulation.  In 1899, the Register of Copyrights' guidelines for 
obtaining copyright registration simply stated that blank forms were not copyrightable.26 A few 
years later, new guidelines were promulgated elaborating on the denial of copyright protection to 
blank forms.27 This guideline provided: 
 
A single sheet, if a literary composition, may be termed a book in applying for 
copyright registration, but printed productions which are partly unfinished, or 
with arranged spaces to be filled in, such as blank forms, account books, ledgers, 
memorandum books, diaries, time and score books, etc., are not productions 
which can be designated "books" and registered as such for copyright 
protection.28 
Lastly, after the 1909 Copyright Act was passed, the Copyright Office was granted 
authority to issue regulations implementing the Copyright Act and it promulgated the following: 
 
The term "book" cannot be applied to blank books for use in business or carrying 
out any system of transacting affairs such as record books, account books, 
memorandum books, diaries or journals, bank deposit and check books; forms of 
contracts or leases which do not contain original copyrightable matter; coupons; 
forms for use in commercial, legal, or financial transactions, which are wholly or 
partly blank and its value lies in their usefulness and not in their merit as literary 
compositions.29 
After the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, the Copyright Office revisited its regulation 
on blank forms.30 The re-examination was terminated in 1980 without amending the existing 
regulation.31 However, the explanation for maintaining the regulation did not shed much light on 
the basis for denying copyright protection to blank forms.  The inquiry suggested that the 
problem may lie in originality or the idea/expression dichotomy, although most of the focus was 
on originality.32 For example, the inquiry termination found that "[a] work which lacks even a 
minimal amount of original, creative expression should be denied registration regardless of 
whether it embodied a new or original idea."33 Further, the Copyright Office stated:  
 
25 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (2006). 
26 Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186, n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing 
Directions for Securing Copyrights 16-17 (1899), reproduced in Compilation of Regulations Concerning Copyright 
1874-1956 (U.S. Copyright Office)). 
27 Id.
28 Id. (citing Directions for Securing Copyrights 24 (1901), reproduced in Compilation of Regulations Concerning 
Copyright 1874-1956 (U.S. Copyright Office)). 
29 Id. (citing Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright § 5 (1910)). 
30 Id. at 1186. 
31 45 Fed. Reg. 63297, 63297-63300 (September 24, 1980). 
32 See generally id.
33 Id. at 63298 (emphasis added). 
6The Baker case and its progeny are embodied in the longstanding practice of the 
Copyright Office to deny registration of a claim in a form designed merely to 
record information if that form contains no original literary or artistic expression 
(i.e., it is "blank").  If a work does evidence at least an appreciable amount of 
such original, creative expression, the Copyright Office will register a claim, 
regardless of whether or not the work also contains uncopyrightable elements 
designed for the simple recordation of information.34 
On the other hand, the inquiry also lends support to the idea/expression dichotomy as a basis for 
denying copyright protection to blank forms.  Citing the House Report accompanying the 1976 
Copyright Act, the Copyright Office determined that the 1976 Act maintained the 
idea/expression dichotomy.35 Because of the Copyright Office's failure to enlighten the public or 
the judiciary and clarify the reasoning behind the denial of copyright protection to blank forms, 
we were left in no better position than where Baker v. Selden left us.  The problem was further 
complicated by reintroducing the idea/expression rationale, rather than the merger doctrine. 
 
b.  The Blank Forms Doctrine Primarily Concerns Originality or Merger? 
 The cases interpreting Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Office's regulation denying 
copyright protection to blank forms do little to clarify whether the rule is about originality or 
merger.   
In Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc.,36 the plaintiff devised a bookkeeping system and 
expressed this system in a book.37 The back of the plaintiff's book contained many forms 
illustrating his system.38 The court determined that the principal question to be decided was 
whether the forms were copyrightable.39 
After quoting substantially from Baker v. Selden, the court held that "[p]laintiff's forms of 
themselves imparted no more information than the words 'credit' or 'debit' at the head of such 
columns as we ordinarily see in any system of simple bookkeeping."40 The focus on the ordinary 
suggests that the problem was with originality.   
But the court was not finished.  It continued on to find the forms embodied in practice 
what the plaintiff taught and the plaintiff's forms could be used, modified, changed, improved, or 
made worse by the public without infringing.41 The court then asked, "How could the public 
appropriate the system identically, if it could not use the forms?"42 This language suggests that 
the problem was that the forms had merged with the underlying system. 
Lastly, the court in Aldrich focused on the Copyright Office's regulation providing that 
books entitled to copyright protection could not be applied to: 
 
34 Id. (emphasis added). 
35 Id. ("[C]opyright may be claimed only in the 'expression' embodied in a work of authorship, and not in its 'idea,'" 
"[T]he basic dichotomy between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable idea(s) remains unchanged."). 
36 Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942). 
37 Id. at 733. 
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 734. 
41 Id.
42 Id.
7Blank books for use in business or in carrying out any system of transacting 
affairs, such as record books, account books, memorandum books, blank diaries 
or journals, bank deposit and check books; forms of contracts or leases which do 
not contain original copyrightable matter; coupons; forms for use in commercial, 
legal, or financial transactions, which are wholly or partly blank and whose value 
lies in their usefulness.43 
This regulation compounds the confusion of Baker v. Selden; it describes the reasoning for 
denying copyright protection as not containing original copyrightable matter, but also because 
the "value lies in their usefulness."  Again, one must wonder whether the reasoning behind 
denying blank forms copyright protection was because they did not possess the requisite amount 
of creativity or because the idea and expression had merged.  In the end, Aldrich did not help 
clarify the problem. 
Almost thirty years later, the court in Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., v. Graphic Controls 
Corporation,44 was confronted with the following question: "Are printed answer sheets, created 
for use in conjunction with student achievement and intelligence tests and designed to be 
corrected by optical scanning machines, the proper subject of copyright?"45 At issue were 
standardized test answer sheets.  The court ultimately found that the answer sheets were entitled 
to copyright protection.   
The court held that although the physical area for originality was limited by the 
requirements of the optical scanning machine, the answer sheets did meet the minimal degree of 
creativity required to be original.46 The minimum level of creativity was apparently expressed 
by the division of the response positions across the page, the information asked for (e.g. name, 
age, date), a determination of whether the student should record on the face of the answer sheet, 
the symbolic code indicating what question is being asked and what possible alternative answer 
slots may be selected, the instruction explaining how to use the answer sheet in conjunction with 
an examination, and examples illustrating such use.47 From these "expressions," the court found 
originality.48 Although granting copyright protection to arguably blank forms, the court in 
Harcourt, Brace & World seized upon the originality issue of the blank forms doctrine and 
helped clarify the underlying problem. 
 Two years later in 1973, the court in Time-Saver Check, Inc. v. Deluxe Check Printers, 
Inc.49 also strengthened the argument that the blank forms doctrine was about originality.  In 
Time-Saver Check, the plaintiff designed and produced a book "related to printed commercial 
bank checks and attached separate duplicates used with carbon paper that [were] meant to be 
retained as accurate records of the checks that [were] written."50 The books contained "several 
diagrams and illustrations of checks and various duplicate forms to be attached thereto and used 
 
43 Id. at 735-736. 
44 Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
45 Id. at 518. 
46 Id. at 523 (noting that the limitations on the answer sheets concerned the shape and maximum number of response 
positions, whether they shall be set horizontally or vertically, the weight of the paper, the size of the sheet, and the 
number of lines per inch). 
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Time-Saver Check, Inc. v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
50 Id. at 510. 
8with carbon paper."51 The book also contained "written descriptions and characterizations of the 
checks, the duplications, the method of binding and producing the marketable product, and the 
manner in which the check and the duplicate copy [were] to be used."52 
The Time-Saver Check court cited the Copyright Office's Circular 32 entitled "Blank 
Forms and Other Uncopyrightable Works" which stated that: 
 
Blank forms and similar works, designed to record rather than to convey 
information, cannot be copyrighted.  In order to be copyrightable, a work must 
contain at least a certain minimum amount of original literary, pictorial, or 
musical material.53 
Based upon this rule, the court found that the plaintiff's checks were "not of such a nature that 
they [were] entitled to protection under the Copyright Statute" because there was "nothing about 
them which [was] creative, original, or artistic."54 Later, the court reiterated its holding when it 
stated that "[t]he checks and the forms for duplicate copies upon which plaintiff relies embody 
no original creative artistic characteristics, and are therefore not protected under copyright 
law."55 The Time-Saver Check decision was another step forward in finding that a lack of 
originality is the problem with blank forms. 
 Adding a semantic twist to the blank forms doctrine, the court in Edwin K. Williams & 
Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. East56 held that gasoline station record-keeping books were 
entitled to copyright protection.57 The court found the books contained several pages of 
instructions followed by thirty-one pages of blank forms, one page for each day of the month.58 
The user was to fill in the day's transactions in the various boxes on the blank forms.59 Some of 
the instructions showed the user how to fill in the forms and others showed the user how to 
operate his business.60 The court recognized Baker v. Selden and noted that the Copyright 
Office's regulation prohibited copyright protection for blank forms that do not in themselves 
convey information.61 The court affirmed the district court's finding that the books at issue 
conveyed information.62 
The intriguing aspect of the Copyright Office's regulation and the Edwin K. Williams 
court's adherence to its language is that the issue was framed in terms of the conveyance of 
information rather than a lack of originality or the application of the merger doctrine.  The failure 
to convey information adds another dimension to the quagmire of the blank forms doctrine.  Are 
works failing to convey information merely a subset of those works lacking originality?  Are 
these works a subset of those merging with their underlying idea because they can only be used 
for recording information?   
 
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
54 Id.
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 Edwin K. Williams & Co., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co. East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976). 
57 Id. at 1061. 
58 Id. at 1060. 
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1060-1061. 
62 Id. at 1061. 
9The genesis of this part of the Copyright Office's regulation appears to be Brown 
Instrument Co. v. Warner,63 where the court found that charts used to record temperature and 
pressure were incapable of copyright protection because the forms did not intend to 
communicate facts or ideas, but were intended solely for use in making records of facts.64 The 
Brown Instrument court explained that because the forms were necessarily used with the 
associated machines, granting copyright protection to the forms would "in effect continue 
[plaintiff's] monopoly of its machines beyond the time authorized by the patent law."65 Thus, the 
Copyright Office's regulation requiring blank forms to convey information appears to suggest 
that merger plays a part in the blank forms doctrine.  Given its reliance on the Copyright Office's 
regulation and the historical context for it, Edwin K. Williams supports the notion that the blank 
forms doctrine is based on merger rather than originality. 
In John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc.,66 the district court held the plaintiff's 
blank checks were not entitled to copyright protection.67 However, its reasoning was far from 
clear.  The court noted that Baker v. Selden was controlling and found that the plaintiff's checks 
actually represented a new system for recording checkbook entries and as such, was not subject 
to copyright protection.68 This reasoning reintroduces and suggests that the problem lies in the 
idea/expression dichotomy.  But later in its opinion, the district court found the plaintiff's checks 
did "not convey any additional information other than that which is contained in an ordinary 
bank check, which neither party contends is copyrightable.  It contains no instructions other than 
specifying 'Pay To' and 'For' lines, as well as indicating spaces for the date and dollar amount."69 
This statement muddied the waters by suggesting that the reasoning for denying the blank checks 
copyright protection was that they lacked originality. 
 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion, but did not clarify 
this issue.  The Eleventh Circuit first noted that "[i]t is well established that blank forms which 
do not convey information or contain original pictorial expression are not copyrightable."70 
After citing to the Copyright Office's regulation, the court held that the plaintiff's blank checks 
were "merely designed for recording information and [did] not convey information or contain 
original pictorial expression."71 Because the court separated conveying information from 
originality, it supports the notion that both merger and originality are the underlying problems 
with blank forms.  The Eleventh Circuit's opinion did not contain a discussion of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, which helped refocus the rationale for the blank forms doctrine back 
to originality and merger rather than expanding the analysis as the district court had done – check 
to make sure there was no such discussion of idea/expression.  However, the court's failure to 
separate the analysis lends little support to the reasoning behind its decision. 
 
63 Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947). 
64 Id. at 911. 
65 Id. Of course, this is not necessarily the case because if one independently created the forms, then there would be 
no copyright infringement because no actual copying would have taken place. 
66 John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. 664 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
67 Id. at 667. 
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
71 Id. at 972 (emphasis added). 
10
In 1982, the court in Januz Marketing Communications, Inc. v. Doubleday & Company, 
Inc.72 found that charts used to record daily activities were not entitled to copyright protection.73 
The two charts at issue are pictured below as Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1 
 
72 Januz Mktg. Communications, Inc. v. Doubleday & Co., 569 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
73 Id. at 81. 
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Figure 2 
 
Rejecting copyright protection for these forms, the court noted that the Copyright Office's 
regulation "embodies the well established rule of Baker v. Selden, 'that forms usable only for the 
recording of information are not copyrightable.'"74 However, like the court in Edwin K. 
Williams, the court also noted that "[a]lthough blank forms or charts are, generally, not 
copyrightable under Baker v. Selden, there is an exception to this rule.  If the blank forms or 
charts contain 'language explanatory of' and 'inseparably included' in the copyrighted textual 
material, then the forms or charts are protected because they convey information."75 Again, this 
rule in and of itself does not clearly denote whether the problem with blank forms exists as a 
result of originality or merger, but as already explained, the regulation's origin suggests a 
problem of merger.76 The court ultimately held that the forms in question did not convey any 
information, either by adding to or clarifying the system, and thus did not fall within the 
exception to Baker v. Selden.77 
74 Id. at 78. 
75 Id. at 79. 
76 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
77 Januz, 569 F. Supp. at 81. 
12
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit decided Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc.78 and 
held the plaintiff's blank forms used in medical billing, known as "superbills," were not entitled 
to copyright protection.79 Each superbill contained simple instructions to the patient for filing 
insurance claims, boxes for patient information, simple clauses assigning insurance benefits to 
the doctor and authorizing release of patient information, and two lengthy checklists for the 
doctor to indicate the diagnosis and any services performed, as well as the applicable fee.80 
The court in Bibbero cited Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Office's regulation on blank 
forms and stated that blank forms are generally not copyrightable unless text is integrated with 
them.81 The court explained that when "a work consists of text integrated with blank forms, the 
forms have explanatory force because of the accompanying copyrightable textual material."82 
The plaintiff argued that its superbills did convey information, but the court rejected this 
argument finding that "[a]ll forms seek only certain information, and, by their selection, convey 
that the information sought is important [and that t]his cannot be what the Copyright Office 
intended by the statement 'convey information.'"83 The court described the superbill's purpose 
(before it is filled out) as recording information, rather than conveying information about the 
patient.84 The court further found that although there was a great deal of printing on the face of 
the form – because there were many possible diagnoses and treatments – this did "not make the 
form any less blank."85 
The court found that the "text with forms" exception to the blank forms rule was 
inapplicable, because the instructions to the patient on how to file an insurance claim were "far 
too simple to be copyrightable as text in and of themselves."86 In essence, the instructions were 
not original.  And strictly speaking, although the instructions were not sufficiently original, this 
statement does not shed any light on whether the forms themselves lacked originality or whether 
the idea and expression had merged.  Reading between the lines however suggests a problem 
with originality rather than merger. 
 In 1991, the Second Circuit, in Kregos v. Associated Press,87 threw yet another twist into 
the blank forms labyrinth.  The court was confronted with whether a blank form used to record 
statistics about baseball pitchers was entitled to copyright protection.  The court paid its due 
deference to Baker v. Selden and noted that courts have split over the issue of whether "forms 
that include considerable blank space" are capable of copyright protection.88 It acknowledged 
that "a form that conveys no information and serves only to provide blank space for recording 
information contains no expression or selection of information that could possibly warrant 
copyright protection."89 But then the court made an interesting comment; it stated that copyright 
 
78 Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990). 
79 Id. at 1105. 
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1106-1107. 
82 Id. at 1107 (citing Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 
976)). 
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1107-1108. 
86 Id. at 1108. 
87 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
88 Id. at 708 (contrasting, inter alia, Bibbero with Harcourt, Brace & World). 
89 Id.
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protection is denied from the failure to convey information because if information is not 
conveyed, then the form fails to "satisfy even minimal creativity."90 
In the end, the court found that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was 
improper because it could not be determined, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff did not display 
sufficient creativity in selecting the columns and headings used on the pitching form.91 
Kregos is important for two reasons.  First, it found that the failure of blank forms to 
convey information was fatal because of originality, rather than merger.  This stands opposite the 
origin of the Copyright Office's regulation concerning the conveyance of information – Brown 
Instrument, discussed supra – and completes the transformation from the merger argument in 
Brown Instrument through the murky period of the decisions in John H. Harland and Januz to 
the originality argument in Kregos.
The second reason Kregos is important is that it drew a distinction between the concept 
of merger and the blank forms doctrine.  Earlier in its opinion, and in a different section with its 
own analysis, the Kregos court recognized that 
 
The fundamental copyright principle that only the expression of an idea and not 
the idea itself is protectable has produced a corollary maxim that even expression 
is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few ways of 
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively accord 
protection to the idea itself.92 
The fact that the Kregos court distinguished this section from its blank forms discussion, coupled 
with the focus on originality in the blank forms section, strongly suggests that the blank forms 
doctrine is not about merger at all, but rather is purely about originality.93 
Having now explored the corridors of the historical maze constituting the blank forms 
doctrine, it is fitting that the most telling words come from a relatively modern case.  As the 
court in Advanz Behavioral Management Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor94 stated: 
 
The blank forms rule is problematic.  [It] has been criticized on a variety of 
grounds.  It has been argued that the rule is an unwarranted extension of dicta 
contained in Baker v. Selden, that it lacks a consistent rationale, that it is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act, and that in light of 
interpretative guidelines issued by the Copyright Office after the 1976 revision of 
the Copyright Act there is no such rule.  These criticism are justified.95 
90 Id. ("When the Copyright Office denies a copyright to scorecards or diaries that 'do not in themselves convey 
information,' it must be contemplating works with headings so obvious that their selection cannot be said satisfy 
even minimal creativity."). 
91 Id. at 710. 
92 Id. at 705. 
93 See also ABR Benefits Services, Inc. v. NCO Group, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1119, 1999 WL 695596 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
9, 1999) ("The restrained interpretation of the Blank Form Rule followed by the Third Circuit mandates that the 
relevant inquiry is whether [the forms] are sufficiently innovative and informative such that the Blank Form Rule 
does not apply."). 
94 Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
95 Id. at 1183 (citations omitted). 
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The court also appropriately concluded that "[a]lthough its origin is clear, the theoretical basis of 
the blank forms rule is murky."96 
In Advanz, the plaintiff had developed blank medical forms, which are reproduced below 
as Figures 3 through 7. 
 
Figure 3 
 
96 Id. at 1184. 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
The plaintiff argued these forms were entitled to copyright protection, but the court rejected this 
argument and found that there was "nothing about the appearance, structure, or layout of the 
forms, that [was] artistic, creative, innovative or distinctive.  They simply consist of labeled 
blanks in which check marks may be made or information may be recorded."97 Moreover, the 
court found that the forms contained no instructions and did not accompany a pamphlet 
explaining how they should be used.98 Like many of its predecessors, the court in Advanz 
continued to blur the already fuzzy line between the originality and merger rationales for the 
blank forms doctrine. 
 
c.  The Common Ground 
 Despite the confusion and various interpretations about the blank forms doctrine and its 
underlying rationale, there exists some common ground upon which all can agree.  This common 
 
97 Id. at 1190. 
98 Id. Of course, the court also strongly criticized Bibbero and the blank forms doctrine in general, but 
acknowledged that it was limited by the Ninth Circuit's prior rulings. 
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ground is for truly blank forms (i.e. those forms containing nothing more than blank spaces and 
are without any accompanying text or instructions).  An example of such is shown below as 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 
 
For those cases following the originality basis for the blank forms doctrine, truly blank 
forms fail to establish the minimum amount of creativity required to be original.  For example, in 
Kregos, the court found that sufficient originality could exist in the blank pitching forms by 
means of the selection of the statistics to emphasize.  Yet the Kregos court noted that "[o]f 
course, a form that conveys no information and serves only to provide blank space for recording 
information contains no expression or selection of information that would possibly warrant 
copyright protection."99 Even a court that had found minimal creativity in a blank form would 
fail to grant copyright protection to truly blank forms.  In fact, the Advanz court, which was 
highly critical of the blank forms doctrine, acknowledged that truly blank forms would not be 
deserving of copyright protection.  The Advanz court stated "[p]erhaps Baker is best interpreted 
as authority for the proposition that neither a system nor an entirely blank form (such as ruled 
paper) is copyrightable in and of itself."100 
On the other hand, for those cases following the merger basis for the blank forms 
doctrine, truly blank forms fail thereunder too.  Truly blank forms are designed for no other basis 
than to record information and implement an underlying system.  Also, because they are truly 
blank, they convey no information and fail under the Copyright Office's regulation, regardless of 
the underlying rationale.  With these thoughts in mind, we now turn to the equally intriguing 
world of design patents. 
 
99 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 708 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
100 Advanz, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
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III.  DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION FOR BLANK FORMS 
A.  General Requirements for Design Patent Protection 
 Since 1842 and under the authority of the "Intellectual Property Clause" of the U.S. 
Constitution,101 Congress has afforded patent protection for designs.102 The current Patent Act 
provides protection to those who invent "any new, original and ornamental design for an article 
of manufacture."103 In addition to these requirements, the design must also be nonobvious.104 
Each of these elements are explored in detail below. 
 
1.  Originality 
Though rarely discussed by the courts, the concept of originality refers to only granting a 
patent to the inventor who actually invented the design.  The originality requirement protects the 
true inventor and the public by preventing "one to harvest what another has sown."105 One 
purpose of the originality requirement is to limit patent monopolies to those who have 
undertaken the efforts to produce the design and who wish to have the patent rights conferred 
upon them.106 
Similar to the originality requirement of copyright law, but less discussed, there is an 
associated creative spark necessary for design patent protection. As stated by the Ninth Circuit, 
"[although] it is difficult to characterize the inventive features necessary to a valid design patent, 
it is clear that there must be originality which is born of inventive genius.  In other words, there 
must be more than mere mechanical skill and the completed article must rise above the 
ordinary."107 The court then held that the design in question, a metal drawer handle, was not new 
and that "the small differences between the design in question and prior designs are well within 
the creative ability of the ordinary designer."108 This was echoed years later when a district court 
noted that originality connotes something that has been created and it signifies something which 
is the converse of commonplace.109 Or as characterized by one commentator, "[d]esign patents 
are supposed to reward a significant level of creativity."110 
Although not discussed in the cases nearly as much as the originality requirement for 
copyright, the concept of design patent originality shares this common thread of creativity with 
the originality requirement for copyright.111 
101 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
102 Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?  Twenty Years of Design Patent 
Litigation Since Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 10 OKLA. CITY L. 
REV. 195, 202 (Summer 1985).  This is the same Constitutional clause granting Congress the power to grant 
copyright protection. 
103 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000). 
104 See id. at § 103, which is incorporated by reference into § 171, which provides that "[t]he provisions of this title 
relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." 
105 1 Donald Chism, Chism on Patents § 2.01 (2006). 
106 Id.
107 Jaybee Mfg. Corp. v. Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp., 287 F.2d 228, 229-230 (9th Cir. 1961). 
108 Id. at 230. 
109 Horwitt v. Longines Wittnauer Watch Co., 388 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
110 Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1401 (June/August 1987). 
111 See supra Part II.A. 
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2.  New (or Novelty) 
 Just as with originality, courts rarely give more than a fleeting nod of acknowledgement 
to the novelty requirement of design patents – instead diving headfirst into the non-functional 
and non-obvious requirements.  The requirement that a design be new or novel "is tested by 
determining the impact of the design upon an ordinary observer.  A design patent is novel when 
the average observer takes the new design for a different, and not a modified already existing 
design."112 Stated another way, the design viewed as a whole must produce a new impression 
upon the eye.113 
3.  Ornamental (or Non-Functional) 
 One of the main issues, if not the main issue, concerning design patent invalidity is that 
of the ornamental and non-functional requirement.  The ornamental requirement means that the 
design must not be governed solely by function.114 Thus, if the design claimed is dictated solely 
by the function of the article of manufacture, the design is invalid for want of being 
ornamental.115 
It is important to note the distinction between the functionality of the article of 
manufacture and the functionality of the particular design of the article of manufacture.116 If this 
distinction were not drawn, then it would be impossible to obtain a design patent on utilitarian 
articles of manufacture, which is clearly not the case.117 
One method of determining whether a design is functional is to see if alternative designs 
are available.118 If so, then a design may not dictated solely by function.119 This test for 
functionality should sound familiar as it is similar to the test used for merger in the copyright 
context.120 
4.  Non-Obviousness 
 The non-obviousness requirement for utility patents121 has been incorporated by reference 
into the design patent statute.122 The non-obvious bar in the Patent Act mandates that a patent 
not be granted when "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
 
112 Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). 
113 Horwitt, 388 F. Supp.at 1260. 
114 Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
115 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
116 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
117 Id.
118 Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566. 
119 Id.; see also L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)("When there are 
several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the design of the article is more likely to serve a 
primarily ornamental purpose."); but see PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Cos., 2006 WL 3334937, *3-5 
(Fed. Cir. Nov 17, 2006) (noting that although alternative designs are relevant, an inquiry should also be made as to 
whether the alternative designs could adversely affect the utility of the specified article). 
120 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
121 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
122 Id. at § 171; see also Chism, supra note 105 at § 23.03[6] (formerly § 1.04[2][f]). 
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invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains."123 
When assessing obviousness in the design patent context, the courts have openly 
admitted that this is a subjective determination.124 To help determine whether a design is 
obvious, the following factors may be used: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the 
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art, 
when the invention was made; and (4) secondary indicia, such as commercial success and 
copying.125 
B.  Blank Forms Receiving Design Patent Protection 
 Design patents have been granted to truly blank forms.  In addition to Figure 8, supra,
below are several drawings corresponding to design patents issued within the last two decades. 
 
Figure 9126 Figure 10127 Figure 11128 
123 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).  There appears to be a split amongst the circuits on the proper perspective to use in 
analyzing obviousness in the design patent context.  See Sidewinder Marine v. Starbuck Kustom Boats, 597 F.2d 
201, 208 (10th Cir. 1979).  Some circuits view obviousness from the perspective of an "ordinary intelligent man" 
whereas others use the "worker of ordinary skill in the art" or "ordinary designer" standard.  Id. This issue is beyond 
the scope of this article and because it does not affect the analysis of this article, I merely note it as a point of 
interest. 
124 Chism, supra note 105 at § 23.03[6] (formerly § 1.04[2][f]). 
125 Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563-1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
126 U.S. Patent No. D473,264 (Apr. 15, 2003) (label form). 
127 U.S. Patent No. D448,404 (Sept. 25, 2001) (address label sheet). 
128 U.S. Patent No. D423,044 (Apr. 18, 2000) (tab compatible divider label sheet). 
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Figure 12129 Figure 13130 
Figure 14131 Figure 15132 
The validity of the design patents pictured in Figures 9 through 15 have not been 
contested.  However the validity of the design patent at issue in Figure 8 was recently litigated in 
 
129 U.S. Patent No. D312,654 (Dec. 4, 1990) (paper sheet). 
130 U.S. Patent No. D418,538 (Jan. 4, 2000) (multi-label mailing form sheet). 
131 U.S. Patent No. D343,416 (Jan. 18, 1994) (business form). 
132 U.S. Patent No. D415,792 (Oct. 26, 1999) (blank sheet for practicing writing). 
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PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Companies.133 In PHG, the plaintiff offered software 
products to hospitals for use in tracking patients and costs.134 Along with this software, the 
plaintiff also sold labels used to record medical chart data and patient identification 
information.135 At first, these two sets of labels were offered separately, but the plaintiff 
eventually combined these two to create the label shown in Figure 8.136 The plaintiff applied for, 
and eventually obtained, design patents for the ornamental design for a label pattern for a 
medical label sheet.137 
The defendant, plaintiff's competitor, also sold medical patient identification labels and 
copied the plaintiff's labels under the belief that "hospitals buy medical labels based on their 
function, not their ornamentation."138 After learning of the defendant's copying, the plaintiff sent 
a cease and desist letter, but the copying continued and litigation ensued.139 
Ruling on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendant's motion 
for partial summary judgment, the district court examined and upheld the validity of the design 
patents.  The defendant argued that the design patents were invalid because the designs were 
primarily functional rather than ornamental.140 
The district court in PHG set forth the basic elements for design patents protection, but 
immediately seized upon the functionality argument.141 The purported ornamental features of 
the form were the size and placement of labels on the sheet, but the defendant argued that the 
placement of different-sized labels on the form was driven purely by function in label use and the 
cost of manufacture.142 After setting forth the test for functionality and noting that "[i]f there are 
several ways to achieve the function of the article of manufacture, the design is more likely to 
serve a primarily ornamental purpose," the court found there were "a multitude of ways to 
arrange different sizes of labels on an 8 ½  x 11 sheet."143 The court also briefly addressed the 
novelty issue by finding that placing various sizes of labels at the bottom of the sheet is what 
distinguished the plaintiff's ornamental design from the prior art.144 Presumably, this variation in 
the form was also not obvious to the "ordinary intelligent man" or the "ordinary designer."145 
The court did not address originality in reaching its conclusion.146 
The defendant appealed and the Federal Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction.147 
The Federal Circuit held that the district court had erred in concluding the plaintiff had met its 
burden of proving a likelihood of success of the merits.148 The district court’s error was that it 
 
133 PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Cos., 2005 WL 3301601 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005); vacated by PHG 
Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Cos., 2006 WL 3334937 (Fed. Cir. Nov 17, 2006). 
134 Id. at *1. 
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at *1-2. 
138 Id. at *2-3. 
139 Id. at *3. 
140 Id. at *5. 
141 Id. at *4-5. 
142 Id. at *5. 
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See supra note 123. 
146 The same court engaged in an identical analysis in a companion case involving the same plaintiff, but different 
defendants.  PHG Technologies, LLC v. Timemed Labeling Sys., Inc., 2006 WL 2670967 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 
2006). 
147 PHG Technologies, LLC v. The St. John Cos., 2006 WL 3334937, *7 (Fed. Cir. Nov 17, 2006). 
148 Id.
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had ignored evidence that the label’s placement served a functional purpose and did not examine 
if the alternative designs would adversely affect the label’s utility.149 Although obviously not a 
favorable ruling for the plaintiff, the validity of the design patent is still in effect and sufficient 
evidence could be presented at trial to overcome the functionality flaw.  Importantly, the Federal 
Circuit did not hold that truly blank forms are categorically denied design patent protection.  
Therefore, even if the design patent in PHG is eventually found to be invalid, the possibility for 
another truly blank form to receive design patent protection remains. 
 
IV.  A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE STANDARDS FOR COPYRIGHT AND 
DESIGN PATENT PROTECTION 
 Having explored the general requirements of copyrights and design patents and the 
historical developments of the blank forms doctrine, it will be helpful to compare a few 
additional significant similarities and differences between copyrights and design patents before 
exploring the inherent inconsistency in the law denying copyright protection to truly blank 
forms, but granting design patent protection. 
 
A.  Obtaining Protection and Withstanding Challenges to Validity 
 It is generally recognized that design patents are more difficult to obtain than copyrights.  
As Professor Wiley noted, courts confronted by the defense that a work is not sufficiently 
original "agree that copyright law demands less originality than does the law of patent."150 
Reemphasizing this point, another commentator once stressed that "[w]hat we now have is too 
easy protection of some designs through copyright.  Other designs come into design patent, 
which, as coldly viewed by the courts, is too hard.151 
The belief that design patents are more difficult to obtain is based not only upon the fact 
that copyright protection attaches automatically upon creation152 whereas to secure design patent 
protection, one must file a patent application153 and pay the prescribed fees.154 As described 
supra, design patent protection requires overcoming several hurdles – originality, novelty, non-
obviousness, ornamental/non-functionality – but copyright only requires that a modicum of 
creativity be exercised and the work not be copied from someone else.   
Another reason design patents are, and should be, harder to obtain is that design patent 
protection is broader than copyright protection.155 Copyright only protects one from copying.156 
If one independently creates an identical work, then copyright infringement has not occurred.157 
"However, an inventor who produces something already patented infringes the patent regardless 
of his knowledge of its existence."158 This wider scope of protection - the power to prohibit 
 
149 Id. at *5. 
150 John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 133 (Winter 1991). 
151 Brown, supra note 110 at 1404. 
152 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation."). 
153 37 C.F.R. § 1.41 (2004). 
154 Id. at § 1.17. 
155 Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1167-1168 (6th Cir. 1980).  The broadness of design 
protection should not be confused with the duration of protection, in which copyright clearly provides more 
protection.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2000) with 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 and 304 (2000). 
156 Schnadig Corp., 620 F.2d at 1168, n.3. 
157 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-346 (1991). 
158 Schnadig Corp., 620 F.2d at 1168, n.3. 
25
unintentional copying - strengthens the rationale for imposing additional burdens upon design 
patents. 
Finally, attacking a patent's validity is more difficult than attacking the validity of a 
copyright.  A patent is presumed valid.159 Invalidity of a design patent must be established by 
clear and convincing evidence.160 On the other hand, when attacking the validity of a copyright, 
the copyright owner is only entitled to a presumption of validity when the work was registered 
with the Copyright Office within five years of its first publication.161 The Copyright Act further 
grants the court discretion to determine the weight to be given to the certificate of registration.162 
Although the courts have not set forth a definitive standard for the burden of proof that the 
defendant must meet to force the burden back to the plaintiff, it appears that the courts do not 
require a clear and convincing standard as is required for design patents.163 As the Third Circuit 
noted, "the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption varies depending on the issue 
bearing on the validity of the copyright," but in some situations evidence must be presented, 
while in others it is only necessary to show that the Copyright Office erroneously applied the 
copyright laws in registering the work.164 As to questions regarding the copyrightability of 
certain works, it has been suggested that the courts are in as good a position as the Copyright 
Office to consider these questions and that in these situations the presumption of validity "is of 
real little force."165 Thus, the heightened standard for invalidating design patents is yet another 
reason why design patents are, and should be, more difficult to obtain than copyrights.  
 
B.  Infringement Standards 
 Another important similarity when comparing blank forms in the copyright context with 
those in the design patent context is the standard for determining infringement.  In a copyright 
infringement action, the standard used to determine whether infringement has taken place is 
whether the alleged infringer's work is substantially similar to the alleged infringed work.166 
Determining substantial similarity is viewed from the perspective of an ordinary lay person.167 
For design patents, the standard for proving infringement requires "that the accused 
design is substantially the same as the claimed design" and "the criterion is deception of the 
ordinary observer, such that one design would be confused with the other."168 Just as in the 
 
159 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
160 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Avia Group Int'l, 853 
F.2d at 1562. 
161 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000). 
162 Id.
163 See Express, LLC v. Fetish Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("The presumption of 
validity orders the burden of proof[,] it does not create the same strong presumption of validity that attaches to 
patents."). 
164 Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 668-669 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
165 Id. at 669 n.7 (citing Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2nd Cir. 1985)). 
166 Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207-208 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
167 Id. at 208. 
168 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Gorham Co. v. White, 
81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511 (1871); Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); Horwitt v. Longines Wittnauer Watch Co., 388 F. Supp. 1257, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
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copyright context,169 it is not necessary for the accused product and the product protected by a 
design patent to be identical; it is sufficient to show substantial similarity of appearance.170 
The similarity between the tests for infringement in the copyright and design patent 
contexts is striking.  Although the test for design patent infringement leans toward confusion of 
the ordinary observer, the focus on substantial similarity between work draws copyright law and 
design patents law closer together, causing different treatment of similar subject matter to be 
questioned. 
 
V.  THE INCONSISTENCY 
 It should now be clear that a glaring inconsistency exists between the treatment of truly 
blank forms in the copyright and design patent contexts.  Copyright's blank forms doctrine, 
whether based on a lack or originality or the merger doctrine, denies protection to truly blank 
forms.171 In contrast, design patents, based on the same Constitutional authority172 and 
maintaining the same general principles of originality and merger173 affords protection to truly 
blank forms.174 Despite the similarity of the rules governing these two fields and the underlying 
policies for those rules, the lack of parity in the treatment of truly blank forms is questionable 
and confusing. 
 This is not to say that copyright protection and design patent protection are or should be 
one in the same.  In fact, the differences between the two disciplines has led to the conclusion 
that design patents are, and should be, more difficult to obtain.175 Again, this raises the question 
of why design patents afford protection to truly blank forms, whereas copyright, with a low 
threshold for protection, refuses to extend to truly blank forms. 
 Consistency between the application of closely related legal rules sharing a common 
origin is not normally a hotly debated issue in the absence of a logical reason for treating the 
same situations differently.  In the case of truly blank forms, there does not appear to be any 
logic in denying copyright protection, but granting design patent protection.  The treatment of 
truly blank forms should be consistent under copyright and design patent laws.  If different 
treatment were appropriate, it should be reversed so truly blank forms are protected by copyright,  
and unprotected by design patents. 
 
VI.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 To bring copyright and design patent law into agreement over the treatment of truly blank 
forms, there appears to be two options: eliminate design patent protection for truly blank forms 
or expand copyright protection to truly blank forms.  Each option has its own associated costs 
and benefits.  This article does not seek to make a determination as to which option is best, but 
instead lays out the pros and cons of each choice in an effort to cause Congress, the Patent and 
 
169 Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("We have frequently held that where 
such substantial similarity is found, slight differences between a protected work and an accused work will not 
preclude a finding of infringement."). 
170 Lindgren, supra note 102 at 215.  
171 See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
172 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
173 See supra Part III.A.1 and notes 118-120 and accompanying text. 
174 See supra Part III.B. 
175 See supra Part IV.A. 
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Trademark Office, the Copyright Office, or the courts to reevaluate the law's treatment of truly 
blank forms and judge what is an appropriate solution. 
 
A.  Eliminate Design Patent Protection for Blank Forms 
 One reason for prohibiting design patents for truly blank forms is that it is an easy rule to 
implement.  As described above, truly blank forms are those forms containing nothing more than 
blank spaces and are without any accompanying text or instructions.176 A regulation 
promulgated and adopted by the Patent Office or an amendment to the Patent Act based on the 
theories set forth in this article could be simple and straightforward.  On the other hand, this 
leaves open the conundrum of what should be done about forms that are not truly blank.  As seen 
in the copyright context, this has caused confusion and a circuit split over what type of blank 
forms are protected.177 
Another benefit of eliminating design patent protection for truly blank forms is that once 
these forms are created, they automatically enter the public domain.  Thus, the public is free to 
use the forms, adapt them, and use them as a springboard for improvements.178 These 
adaptations and improvements are the progresses of science and the useful arts that the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution strives for.179 But to claim that elimination of 
design patents would effectuate this Constitutional provision would be to read the clause too 
narrowly.  This Intellectual Property Clause provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."180 The prelude to 
promoting adaptations and improvements is that the author or inventor was given the opportunity 
to reap the benefits of the creation before it passed into the public domain.  If truly blank forms 
were no longer provided design patent protection, then this prelude would not exist and the 
Intellectual Property Clause would not be effectuated. 
 Closely related to this point is that if design patent protection was no longer afforded to 
truly blank forms, then inventors would, in theory, have less incentive to develop these types of 
forms.  Without the incentive of design patent protection, there would, in theory, be a decrease in 
the development of truly blank forms, from which the public would no longer be able to use, 
adapt, and improve.  However, this theory must be balanced with the argument that blank forms 
are generally used in industries to help with efficiency and productivity and this is what really 
drives the creation of truly blank forms.  Without empirical data or further research, the 
elimination or reduction of incentive is speculative. 
 Lastly, eliminating design patent protection for truly blank forms may lead to a decrease 
in patent infringement prosecution and litigation, thus freeing up administrative and judicial 
 
176 See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
177 See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
178 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-967 (Fall 1990) ("[T]he very act of authorship 
in any medium is more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the 
sea."). 
179 U.S. Const., art. I, sect. 8, cl. 8. 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
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resources.181 However, with respect to design patent litigation, it should be noted that very little 
truly blank form design patent litigation has taken place.182 
B.  Expand Copyright Protection to Truly Blank Forms 
 The other option to resolve the inconsistency is to expand copyright protection to truly 
blank forms.  As discussed supra, the blank forms doctrine is already highly criticized and 
confusing.183 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Bibbero compounds this and has been reluctantly 
followed by its district courts.184 Expanding copyright protection to truly blank forms would 
moot the split amongst the circuits as to which forms convey information and which do not. 
 Just as eliminating design patent protection for truly blank form would be easy to 
implement, expanding copyright protection would be equally simple.  But unlike the design 
patent solution, expanding copyright protection would not create new problems for blank forms 
that are not truly blank.185 
Opposite the argument made in support of and in criticism of denying design patent 
protection to truly blank forms is the argument that expanding copyright protection would 
provide an additional incentive for form creators to exercise their talents and create new 
forms.186 The fact that some industries create truly blank forms as a matter of efficiency and 
productivity would not reduce the incentive to create new forms.187 On the other hand, if 
copyright protection is expanded, then less works are placed in the public domain, which may 
delay creativity (e.g. transformation, adaptations, improvements), thus depriving the public 
good.188 Of course, granting thin copyright protection to truly blank forms might provide some 
relief.189 
As discussed supra, there is already a fair amount of blank form copyright litigation that 
has taken place over the last century.190 If copyright protection were expanded to truly blank 
forms (and blank forms generally), there could be an increase in blank forms litigation, thus 
draining more judicial resources.  However, granting thin copyright protection to blank forms 
might also help in this regard. 
 Lastly, expanding copyright protection to truly blank forms might also have the effect of 
freeing up resources at the Copyright Office.  If examiners were not required to engage a blank 
 
181 See Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law 
and Policy 12-13 (Oct. 2003) ("The PTO's resources also appear inadequate to allow efficient and accurate 
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forms analysis, which is admittedly confusing and burdensome, more time and money could be 
spent addressing other copyright concerns. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 The law should strive to be consistent and rational.  Without these qualities, those living 
under it will fail to appreciate and respect it.  The blank forms doctrine, with its vague 
underpinnings and muddled history has been interpreted inconsistently, but clearly prevents truly 
blank forms from being afforded copyright protection. 
 Design patents, on the other hand, have been freely granted to truly blank forms – a level 
where copyright protection does not extend.  Given the general agreement that design patents 
are, and should be, more difficult to obtain, it appears that the law has turned itself completely 
backwards with respect to truly blank forms.  This backwards state of affairs has produced an 
inconsistent and irrational result where copyright law, with its low threshold, rejects protection 
for truly blank forms whereas design patents, with its higher burden, accepts truly blank forms 
with open arms.  There is no rational explanation for this inconsistency. 
 Fortunately, there are solutions.  To harmonize copyright and design patent law with 
respect to truly blank forms, two options exist – eliminate design patent protection for truly blank 
forms or expand copyright protection to truly blank forms.  The costs and benefits of each have 
been set forth and there are various methods for implementing the choice, whichever it may be.  
Ultimately, a choice should be made.  Without one, the law will continue to be inconsistent and 
irrational, thus weakening society's appreciation and respect for the rule of law. 
 
